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Abstract We propose a model, based on the work of Brock and Dur-
lauf, which looks at how agents make choices between competing techno-
logies, as a framework for exploring aspects of the economics of the ad-
option of privacy-enhancing technologies. In order to formulate a model
of decision-making among choices of technologies by these agents, we
consider the following: context, the setting in which and the purpose for
which a given technology is used; requirement, the level of privacy that
the technology must provide for an agent to be willing to use the techno-
logy in a given context; belief, an agent’s perception of the level of privacy
provided by a given technology in a given context; and the relative value
of privacy, how much an agent cares about privacy in this context and
how willing an agent is to trade off privacy for other attributes. We in-
troduce these concepts into the model, admitting heterogeneity among
agents in order to capture variations in requirement, belief, and relative
value in the population. We illustrate the model with two examples: the
possible effects on the adoption of iOS devices being caused by the re-
cent Apple–FBI case; and the recent revelations about the non-deletion
of images on the adoption of Snapchat.
1 Introduction
Recent high-profile events — such Snowden’s revelations about surveillance and
the dispute between Apple and the FBI — have demonstrated the increasing
significance of privacy concerns for individuals, organizations, and governments.
As privacy-enhancing technologies become more widely available, and are in-
creasingly incorporated into consumer products such as messaging apps, it is
interesting and important to understand the factors affecting the adoption by
consumers of different technologies. In this paper, we propose a model of how
agents make choices between competing technologies, as a framework for explor-
ing aspects of the economics of the adoption of privacy-enhancing technologies.
Acquisti et al. [3] deliver an excellent up-to-date survey of the economics
of privacy. They provide for historical evolution of the economic theory of pri-
vacy from its early beginnings — starting with Posner [15,16] and Stigler [20],
arguing in favour of limiting privacy in the name of market efficiency — to
the counterexamples where improved privacy (i.e., restrictions on the access to
private information) may be welfare improving. According to Acquisti et al. [3]:
‘Privacy is, after all, a process of negotiation between public and private,
a modulation of what a person wants to protect and what she wants to
share at any given moment and in any given context.’
Other work has considered the role of privacy in technology adoption (for ex-
ample, [17]) or considered economic factors affecting privacy [21] or privacy-
enhancing technology adoption [1,2].
We introduce a characterization of privacy based on four key factors: context,
the setting in which, and the purpose for which, a given technology is used;
requirement, the level of privacy that the technology must provide for an agent
to be willing to use the technology in a given context; belief, an agent’s perception
of the level of privacy provided by a given technology in a given context; and the
relative value of privacy, how much an agent cares about privacy in this context
and how willing an agent is to trade off privacy for other attributes.
We introduce these concepts into the proposed model, admitting heterogen-
eity among agents in order to capture variations in requirement, belief, and
relative value in the population.
In categorizing the agents’ different attitudes to privacy we adopt the useful
classification of Harris and Westin [9,14], who divide the agents into three groups
based upon their own perceptions of the value of their own privacy:
The Fundamentalist. Fundamentalists are generally distrustful of or-
ganizations that ask for their personal information, worried about the
accuracy of computerized information and additional uses made of it,
and are in favour of new laws and regulatory actions to spell out privacy
rights and provide enforceable remedies. They generally choose privacy
controls over consumer-service benefits when these compete with each
other. About 25% of the public are privacy Fundamentalists.
The Pragmatist. Pragmatists weigh the benefits to themes of vari-
ous consumer opportunities and services, protections of public safety
or enforcement of personal morality against the degree of intrusiveness
of personal information sought and the increase in government power
involved. They look to see what practical procedures for accuracy, chal-
lenge and correction of errors the business organization or government
agency follows when consumer or citizen evaluations are involved.
They believe that business organizations or government should “earn”
the public’s trust rather than assume automatically that they have it.
And, where consumer matters are involved, they want the opportunity
to decide whether to opt out of even non-evaluative uses of their personal
information as in compilations of mailing lists. About 57% of the public
fall into this category.
The Unconcerned. The Unconcerned are generally trustful of organ-
izations collecting their personal information, comfortable with existing
organizational procedures and uses are ready to forego privacy claims
to secure consumer-service benefits or public-order values and not in fa-
vour of the enactment of new privacy laws or regulations. About 18% of
public fall into this category.
Sharing personal information may be perceived as risky or costly— facilit-
ating identity theft, inviting unwanted attention by individuals or institutions,
and possibly introducing limited participation in certain activities (e.g., exclu-
sion from health insurance). Such negative impacts are known and the degree
of aversion to the loss of privacy will differ between individuals depending upon
their preferences and context.
The model — taking into account the privacy characteristics of competing
technologies and the preferences of agents — indicates the expected levels of
adoption of the competing technologies in different contexts. For example, send-
ing different types of content with different levels of sensitivity over a service,
such as Snapchat. By varying the parameters of the model — reflecting the the
characteristics of the technologies and the attitudes of the decision-making con-
sumers — we explore how these factors influence the adoption of the different
technologies.
In Section 2, we introduce the basic Brock-Durlauf model upon which our
work is based. We also explain briefly our extension, from previous work [7], of
this model to encompass multiple attributes. In Section 3, we present our main
theoretical contribution. Using our analysis of the key characteristics of privacy,
together with Westin’s characterization of attitudes towards privacy, we adapt
our extended Brock-Durlauf set-up to model the adoption of privacy-enhancing
technologies. In Section 4, we discuss two examples. First, the recent dispute
between between Apple and the FBI [4] and, second, Snapchat, exploring the
effects of the population’s changing beliefs about and requirements for privacy.
Finally, in Section 5, we summarize our analysis.
2 Background: the Brock–Durlauf model
Brock and Durlauf model a market where various technologies compete for ad-
option by a number of agents. The agents choose which technology to adopt
based on the technologies’ relative profitabilties as well as the strength of the
technologies’ social externalities; that is, how much the value of a technology
increases as the number of other agents choosing it increases. This last feature
makes the model particularly useful for looking at communication technologies—
which form a large part of PETS—because the value of a technology increases
with the number of people you can communicate with using it. The model can
also look at exongenously-imposed policy, in the form of incentives or taxation,
as well as increasing profitabilities through technological progress.
2.1 The basic Brock–Durlauf model
The basic model consists of M different technologies competing in a market for
adoption by N agents. The utility for an agent of a technology γ in time period
t is given by
uγ,t = λγ + ργxγ,t (1)
where λγ is the profitability of the technology, xγ,t is the fraction of agents using
technology γ at time t, and ργ > 0 gives the strength of the social externalities.
A low value of ργ means the utility of the technology will not increase much
as adoption rises; a high value means that the social component, ργxγ,t, can
influence the utility of the technology significantly.
In the model, each agent i experiences their own utility from their choice,
u˜γ,i,t = uγ,t + γ,i,t, plus noise, where the noise term γ,i,t represents a ran-
dom private component of utility and is independent and identically distributed
across agents and known to the agent when it makes its decision. If the noise
follows a double exponential distribution, then, as the number of agents tends to
infinity, the probability that an agent will adopt technology γ at time t—which
is equivalent to that technology’s share of the market—converges to
xγ,t =
eβuγ,t−1∑M
j=1 e
βuj,t−1
. (2)
See [7] for more explanation of this equation.
The parameter β is inversely proportional to the variance of the noise, , and
characterises the degree to which choices made by the agents are determined by
the deterministic components of utility. As β → 0, choices are totally random
and each technology will tend towards an equal share of the market; as β →∞,
choices have no random component and the agents will all choose to adopt the
technology providing the highest utility.
In Brock and Durlauf [5,6], the agents make decisions based on their expect-
ations of the decisions of others in the same time period. The model can then be
used to find the adoption equilibria. In contrast, we wish to look at the dynam-
ics of adoption over time. Instead of using agents’ expectations about others’
decisions in the same time period, agents use information about the levels of
adoption in the previous time period, as shown by the use of uc,t−1 in Equation
2.
The original definition of utility for a technology, in Equation 1, can be expan-
ded to include a component determined by a policy-maker. This can represent,
for example, some form of taxation or incentive designed to increase the adoption
of a particular technology.
uγ,t = λγ + ργxγ,t − τγ(x1,t, . . . , xM,t) (3)
This policy component takes the form of a function, τγ(x1,t, . . . , xM,t), for
each different technology γ and gives the level of incentive or taxation based on
the adoption shares of all the technologies in the market. This means that, for
example, a policy-maker could apply an incentive to a technology that decreases
as it becomes more widely adopted. Policies that tax one technology and use the
benefits to promote another can be modelled by using opposite-signed functions
on the two technologies.
Switching costs can also be added to the model by introducing asynchronous
updating. That is, a portion α of the agents do not switch technologies in each
time period, simulating the retarding effect switching costs have on the speed
with which new technologies are adopted:
xγ,t = αxγ,t−1 + (1− α) e
βuγ,t−1∑M
j=1 e
βuj,t−1
. (4)
Equilibria. The model allows for equilibria; that is, where the share of adoption
in one time period is the same as the previous time period. For low values of ρ,
there will only be one equilibrium point. For higher values, it is possible to have
multiple equilibria. In general, the model will, over time, approach one of the
equilibrium points.
Except in the case where β = ∞, a technology will never have all of the
share of the market or become extinct: some (possibly very small) portion of the
population will continue to choose it.
2.2 Extension to multiple attributes
In [7], we looked at how the Brock–Durlauf model could be applied to the adop-
tion of encryption technologies. A key point from this work is that representing
technologies with a single attribute, profitability, is not suitable for creating use-
ful models about encryption adoption. Instead, it is necessary to use multiple
attributes which better represent the technologies and the way decisions to use
them are made. Multi-attribute utility theory is explained in [13] and applied to
security in [11].
This is achieved by adapting the model to use a set of attributes, A. Now,
the utility for each technology (Equation 1) becomes
uγ,t =
∑
a∈A
vγ,a + ργxγ,t, (5)
where vγ,a is the value of attribute a for technology γ.
Similarly, including policy, Equation 3 becomes
uγ,t =
∑
a∈A
vγ,a + ργxγ,t − τγ(x1,t, . . . , xM,t). (6)
The attributes used depend on the technologies being modelled and the pur-
pose for which the models are intended. In [7], we used three attributes: monetary
cost, functionality, and usability.
3 Modelling privacy
The basic approach of the model as described in Section 2 is not adequate for
modelling the adoption of privacy-enhancing technologies. The model must be
extended to capture the characteristics of privacy. This represents a significant
enrichment of the model to capture a more complex collection of interacting
factors, including heterogeneity of agents.
In this section, we first discuss these characteristics; then, we describe how
the model is extended to include them. Finally, we discuss the effects of different
choices of parameters.
3.1 The characteristics of privacy
We consider a society of decision-making entities who wish to protect the privacy
of certain information that they own in a range of contexts in which they interact
with the providers of goods and services. These interactions are typically enabled
by technologies with differing privacy-protecting characteristics.
Some transactions are more sensitive than others for some individuals. For
example, some individuals will choose to use online banking services, in which
private information is potentially exposed to the public internet, and some will
prefer to perform their financial transactions in person at a branch of their bank,
where the immediate exposure is limited to the specific bank employees involved.
We can deconstruct this situation in different ways. It may be the user of
online banking simply does not place a high value on their privacy or it may be
that they do place a high value on their privacy, but also believe that the the
bank’s systems provide adequate protection for their judgement of value of their
privacy. Similarly, the in-branch may believe that the online privacy protections
do provide adequate protection for their judgement of the value of their privacy.
This set-up illustrates two characteristics that we need to incorporate into
our model: first, that agents have a judgement of the value of their privacy; and,
second, that they have beliefs about the ability of a given technology to protect
their privacy given their judgement of its value.
These two examples illustrate the use of particular technologies to access
services in specific contexts. In general, services, such as banking, will accessed
in different contexts. For example, the user of online banking may be willing use
the service from a personal computer at home, but not from a shared public
computer: their belief about the level of protection is dependent on the context.
So, in order to formulate a model of decision-making among choices of tech-
nologies by these agents, we must consider what are the relevant characteristics
of privacy in this context.
– Context : the setting in which and the purpose for which a given technology
is used.
– Requirement : the level of privacy that the technology must provide for an
agent to be willing to use the technology in a given context.
– Belief : an agent’s perception of the level of privacy provided by a given
technology in a given context.
– Relative value of privacy : how much an agent cares about privacy in this
context and how willing an agent is to trade off privacy for other attributes
Attitudes to privacy have been classified into three groups — fundamentalist,
pragmatist, and unconcerned — by Westin [9,22]. The final characteristic above,
the relative value of privacy, includes the idea of a trade-off between privacy
and other attribrutes. The Westin groups provide a convenient way in which to
organize agents into groups with simliar trade-off preferences. The examples in
Section 4 illustrate this organization.
3.2 An adoption model using the privacy characteristics
We can capture these characteristics of privacy in the model by making some
changes to its structure.
First, we can capture context by by increasing the granularity of the model—
instead of looking at technologies’ share of the market, we can look at how adop-
tion is shared between technologies’ use in different contexts. Each technology is
divided into multiple technology–context components, and the model now looks
at how agents choose between these.
We introduce a set of all of these components, C, with subsets Cγ containing
all of the components for technology γ. Now, we define uc,t to be the utility
of component c, rather than a technology. Similarly, xc,t is now the share of a
component, not a technology, at time t.
The total share of a technology γ is now given by the sum of its components:
xγ,t =
∑
c∈Cγ
xc,t. (7)
As an example, consider a cloud storage technology, where users can keep
backups of their files. This could be divided into three different contexts based
on its use for different purposes: storing photos, storing documents, and using
it to do both of these. Each context offers different advantages (and so has
different values for its attributes), and for each context agents may have different
requirements for privacy. One agent might feel that photos require more privacy
their than documents do, whereas another might feel the opposite.
In the model up to this point, agents have been homogenous in terms of
the utility they receive from a technology, with the only difference coming from
c,i,t, the private utility they receive from the noise. Modelling privacy requires
heterogeneity: each agent has different preferences towards privacy, different re-
quirements, and a different willingness to trade privacy for other attributes.
We add this to the model by giving each agent i a value bc,i ∈ [0, 1] for
their belief about how well a component preserves or provides privacy, a value
rc,i ∈ [0, 1] for the agent’s required level of privacy for a component, and a
value wc,i > 0 as a weight indicating the relative importance of privacy (in a
component) to other attributes in the model. The utility function used in the
model then becomes
uc,i,t = pig(i)(bc,i, rc,i, wc,i) +
∑
a∈A
vc,a + ρcxc,t − τc(x1,t, . . . , xM,t). (8)
where g(i) gives the group an agent belongs to and pig(i)(bc,i, rc,i, wc,i) is a
tradeoff function that specifies how the utility an agent recieves from privacy
changes for varying levels or belief, requirement, and value of privacy—essentially,
how willing they are to trade privacy for other attributes.
Introducing the idea of a group here provides a convenient way of represent-
ing different attitudes towards security, and allows us to capture ideas such as
Westin’s [22,9] groups. In theory, each agent could belong to its own group, each
with a different trade-off function, but it would be immensely difficult to get
the data required to fit a function to each participant in a study, for example.
Agents in a group share the same trade-off function, meaning that they respond
to different values of belief and requirements about privacy in the same way.
In this paper, we divide the population of agents into three groups, based
on Westin’s classifications of attitudes about privacy. Each group has a different
trade-off function, which are shown in Figure 1. For those unconcerned about
privacy, there is little difference between components that meet requirements
and those that do not. For pragmatists, any component that satisfies require-
ments receives the full utility value, with a linear trade-off for those that do
not. For fundamentalists, there is very steep decline in utility value—quickly
going negative—for components for which beliefs about privacy do not meet
requirments. The trade-off functions are
pifund(bc,i, rc,i, wc,i) = wc,i
0.5 + tanh(10(bc,i − rc,i + 0.1))
1.5
(9)
piprag(bc,i, rc,i, wc,i) =
{
wc,i bc,i − rc,i > 0
wc,i(bc,i − rc,i + 1) bc,i − rc,i ≤ 0
(10)
piunco(bc,i, rc,i, wc,i) = 0.1wc,i(bc,i − rc,i) + 0.9. (11)
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Figure 1. Trade-off functions for each of the Westin groups. The figure shows the
utility received from privacy given the difference in beliefs and requirements when
privacy value is 1.
We can update Equation 3 to account for the heterogeniety by summing over
the population of agents. Now, the share of each technology–context component
is given by
xc,t =
1
N
N∑
i=1
eβuc,i,t−1∑C
j=1 e
βuj,i,t−1
. (12)
Each agent here has an equal weight (1/N) and represents an equal share of
the population, but this could easily be changed so that agents have different
weights, making them representative of different proportions of the population.
This might be useful, for example, when polling a population, where some agents’
characteristics have a greater likelihood.
3.3 Parameters
Sample size. In the examples below, we approximate the distribution of pref-
erences about privacy, including requirements, beliefs, and values by using beta
distributions to represent the distribution of values in the population. We then
sample from these distributions to create a collection of agents with heterogenous
properties.
As the sampling is random, the points chosen can influence the behaviour of
the model. We ran 100 trials for each of a number of different sample sizes in
order to observe the magnitude of this influence. Figure 2 shows the mean and
±2σ values for each of the sample sizes.
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Figure 2. Demonstration of the effect of sample size. The figure shows the mean and
±2σ for samples sizes of 100, 500, 1000, 2500, 5000, and 10000.
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Figure 3. Demonstration of the effect of
parameter β. With a high β, the adop-
tion of the more profitable technology is
greater.
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Figure 4. Demonstration of the effect of
parameter ρ.
As expected, the variance of the low sample sizes is higher than for the larger
sample sizes. For 100 samples, the 5%-95% range is 0.03491; for 5000 it is 0.0053,
and for 10000 samples it is 0.0030. We use 10000 samples in all examples below.
The β parameter. The parameter β is inversely related to the variance of
the noise γ,i,t, which is a private component of the utility an agent gets for a
particular choice of technology γ. As the variance of the noise grows—so, as β
grows smaller—the less the other, deterministic components of utility matter.
Conversely, as β grows larger and the variance of the noise decreases, agents
increasingly make their choice based on the deterministic parts of the utility
function.
Figure 3 shows the adoption over time for a technology for different values of
β. The technology shown is slightly more profitable than the competing techno-
logy, but all other values are the same. For low β, the more profitable technology
shares the market with its competitor evenly. As β grows, more agents adopt
the more profitable technology.
In the examples below, we use a value β = 3.0.
Social effects. The parameter ρc controls the strength of social effects for a
component. Figure 4 shows the effect of different values of ρ on the adoption
curve (plotting xt against xt+1) of a technology. Both technologies use the same
parameter values (including ρ), except for profitability, which is slightly higher
for the technology shown.
As the value of ρ grows, the utility of a technology increases with increased
adoption. High values of ρ amplify increases in utility from adoption.
Also shown in the figure is a diagonal line where xt = xt+1, meaning that
the system is in equilibrium. For the lower values of ρ the adoption curves only
have one equilibrium, meaning that adoption will approach this point over time.
When ρ = 1, there are three equilibria: two stable points, low and high, and
a third, unstable point near x = 0.4. If the initial state is below the unstable
equilibrium, adoption will move towards the lower equilibrium; if it is higher
than the unstable equilibrium, adoption will move towards to the higher stable
equilibrium.
4 Examples
We discuss in detail two examples. First, we consider the recent dispute been
Apple and the FBI [4], with the purpose of demonstrating how beliefs and
requirements about privacy influence adoption. Second, we consider Snapchat
(www.snapchat.com, accessed 03/03/2016), a picture-messaging app which prom-
ised that images were available only for brief periods time, but for which it tran-
spired that images were in fact retained [18]. We use this example to demonstrate
the role of context in privacy decision-making regarding the use of the techno-
logy.
Both of these examples are intended to be illustrative of the theoretical
model. It would of course be valuable to condition the examples on empirical
data. However, such data collection and analysis, requiring substantial dedic-
ate effort, is beyond our current scope. The paper by Brock and Durlauf [6]
shows how the basic model can be fitted by maximum likelihood estimation; in
principle, our extensions can be given a similar analysis.
Building on our discussion in Section 3, we remark that the example discussed
there — namely access to banking services — would also provide an examples
of the issues discussed in this section.
The model is implemented using the julia language [12].
4.1 Apple v FBI
In California, there is an ongoing case between Apple and the FBI, where the
FBI is investigating the San Bernardino killings and wishes to access one of the
killer’s locked and encrypted iPhones. The FBI is seeking a court order, under
the All Writs Act, to compel Apple to assist in unlocking the device, possibly
by creating and signing a custom firmware image that would allow the FBI to
brute-force the password easily. Apple has argued against the FBI and the case
has generated a great amount of media coverage.
For this example, we are interested in the effects this media coverage. Apple
has publicly stated during the course of the case that it believes firmly in the
privacy of its customers; this can be viewed as a strong signal about the level
of privacy provided by Apple products and agents may update their beliefs in
response, resulting in a change of technology choice. We will use the model to
explore how adoption changes in response to shifting beliefs about the privacy
a technology provides, shifting requirements, and shifts in both of these simul-
taneously.
Set-up. In this example, we look at two technologies competing against each
other, without considering any distinct contexts. The first technology is Apple’s
iPhone, and we look at its adoption when competing against Android phones.
For simplicity, we do not consider any attributes other than cost in this
example; we assume that usability and functionality are essentially equivalent
between the devices. Cost, on the other hand, differs: Apple devices tend to me
more expensive than the bulk of android phones. Accordingly, we use a value of
1.1 for Apple and 1.5 for Android.
The value of ρ indicates how much the utility agents gain from adopting a
technology increases as more agents begin to use it. In the case of mobile phones,
they are largely interoperable with each other, and many of the applications
written for them are present on both Apple and Android devices, suggesting
that the value of ρ should be low. However, there are functions on the phone,
such as Apple’s iMessage, which increase in utility as more people use them,
meaning that there is some social effect present. For this example, then, we use
a value of ρ = 0.5 for both technologies.
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Figure 5. Distributions representing the
value of privacy for the different Westin
groups in the population.
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Figure 6. Distributions representing the
requirements for privacy of the different
Westin groups in the population.
We need to make some assumptions about the distributions of values, be-
liefs, and requirements of security in the population. First, Figure 5 shows the
distributions we are using for the value of privacy. There is a seperate distri-
bution for each of the three Westin categories. We assume that fundamentalists
are more likely to place a higher value on privacy than the pragmatic and the
unconcerned. Similarly, we assume that it is more likely that the pragmatic have
a higher value of privacy than the unconcerned. For this example, we say that
privacy fundamentalists form 25% of the population, pragmatists 55%, and the
unconcerned the remaining 20%.
Next, Figure 6 shows the distributions from which requirements about pri-
vacy are drawn. Again, we assume that fundamentalists are likely to have higher
requirements than the pragmatic, and the pragmatic are likley to have higher
requirements than the unconcerned.
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Figure 7. Distributions representing the
initial beliefs about the privacy provided
by Apple and Android mobile phones.
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Figure 8. Increasing beliefs about the
privacy provided by Apple phones.
Finally, we look at the distributions from which we sample values for belief
about the privacy provided by the different technologies. These distributions of
belief are shared by the entire population and are not segmented into Westin
groups. Figure 7 shows the distributions; agents are more likely to believe that
an Apple phone provides a greater level of privacy compared to Android than
vice versa.
Changing Beliefs. Now, we will examine what are the likely effects on adoption
of a shift in beliefs about the privacy provided by Apple phones. As stated above,
the shift is a hypothetical one caused by the media attention around the Apple
v FBI case and Apple’s public stance on privacy. As such, we will look at how
adoption changes for different magnitudes in shifts in belief to understand the
range of possible effects.
We model the shifts in beliefs by changing the distribution of beliefs in the
population and randomly sampling again. We look at four different distributions
of beliefs about the privacy of Apple phones; we do not alter the distribution for
Android phones. The different distributions are show in Figure 8, labeled 1–4,
each with increasing probability of a higher belief about privacy. The first is the
same distribution shown in Figure 7.
Table 1. Equilibrium Apple share values for shifts in belief.
Shift Equilibrium
1 (orig.) 0.1402
2 0.1585
3 0.1667
4 0.1806
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Figure 9. Adoption curves for the different levels of belief.
The resulting adoption curves are shown in Figure 9. The shifts in belief about
the privacy provided by Apple phones result in increased adoption. Table 1 shows
the equilibrium values for the four shifts. The base case, 1, shows Apple with a
14% share of the market—intentionally close to the actual share in 2015 [10].
With each shift, the share of the market grows, showing that agents receive
greater utility from technology that better meets their requirements and thus
switch.
Changing Requirements. Next, we consider what happens if the media cov-
erage increases agents’ awareness of the need for privacy, resulting in a shift in
requirements. As we are using different distributions of requirements for each
of the Westin categories, we need to shift all three distributions to model the
change in requirements. These are shown in Figure 10. In each case, the distri-
butions shift to the right, making higher values for the requirement for privacy
more likely.
The adoption curves for the shifts in requirement are shown in Figure 11.
Unlike the shifts in beliefs, the shifts in requirements do not result in increased
adoption. As Table 2 shows, there is a fractional increase, indicating that some
agents are switching technologies, but this could also be explained by sampling
variance.
This behaviour is expected, when considering the way the model is construc-
ted. The previous shift in belief change the value for just Apple technology,
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Figure 10. Shifting requirements for each of the Westin groups.
Table 2. Equilibrium Apple share values for shifts in requirement.
Shift Equilibrium
1 (orig.) 0.1417
2 0.1429
3 0.1451
4 0.1429
increasing its utility. This shift in requirements changes the requirements for
both Apple and Android, meaning that any relative changes will be smaller.
Agents of the pragmatic or unconcerned types will not experience a large relat-
ive change in utility when requirements shift—any increase for Apple is likely to
be too small to overcome the utility derived from cost. The only fundamentalist
agents that would change technologies are those for whom both technologies met
their requirements before the shift and only Apple after the shift.
Changing Beliefs and Requirements. Here, we look at what happens if
there are shifts in both belief and requirement simultaneously. We use the same
shifts as previously shown in Figure 8 and Figure 10.
Figure 12 shows the adoption curves when both belief and requirements are
shifted. The equilibrium values are shown in Table 3. The increase in adoption
here is greater than in the shift of beliefs or requirements alone. The combination
Apple share at time=t (xt)
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
1
2
3
4
x
t
 = x
t+1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Ap
pl
e 
sh
ar
e 
at
 ti
m
e=
t+
1 
(x
t+
1)
Figure 11. Adoption curves for the different levels of requirements.
Table 3. Equilibrium Apple share values for shifts in belief and requirement.
Shift Equilibrium
1 (orig.) 0.1400
2 0.1634
3 0.1840
4 0.2011
of shifting both beliefs and requirements results in a relative increase in utility
for Apple.
4.2 Snapchat
In this example, we explore the use of contexts and how privacy affects in which
contexts agents choose to use technology by looking at the ephemeral picture
messaging application Snapchat. This is a widely used application that gives its
users the ability to control how long the messages they send can be seen by the
recipients, after which the messages are deleted. However, the messages are not
deleted securely, and can still be recovered after they have disappeared from the
application.
Set-up. Roesner et al. [18] survey users of Snapchat, asking which types of con-
tent users send and how they feel about privacy. They give the breakdown of the
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Figure 12. Adoption curves for increas-
ing levels of belief and requirements.
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Figure 13. Adoption over time for dif-
ferent contexts. The revelation about
Snapchat’s non-deletion of messages oc-
curs after time t = 5.
study participants into Westin groups (39.4% fundamentalist, 45.7% pragmatist,
12.6% unconcerned) and report how many users primarily send sexual content
(1.6%) and how many have sent sexual content (14.2%).
We use these values directly in this example. We model three different con-
texts: sending only explicit content, sending only non-sensitive content, and us-
ing the technology for both. We say that Snapchat is competing against another
similar application (which has the same contexts), but Snapchat initially has the
majority share of adoption, around 90%.
We assume that the values of usability and cost are the same for both tech-
nologies, but there is a difference in the utility received from functionality. For
Snapchat, we assign using it for only explicit content the value 0.9; for mixed
explicit and non-sensitive use 1.5, and for non-sensitive use only 1.54. For the
competing technology, in the same order, we use the values 0.8, 1.2, and 1.44.
These values were chosen so that the model roughly matches the values reported
in Roesner et al. [18]. The values for the explicit-only and mixed-content use
contexts are less than the non-sensitive context. This is because—even though
an agent using the technology for both types of content technically has greater
functionality—the proportion of agents who actually generate explicit content is
very small and the attribute values reflect the utility received by the population
of agents.
Since we are looking at messaging applications, the value of social effects is
very high: the utility of such an application increases with the number of people
you can contact using it. As such, we use a value of ρ = 1.
The distributions used for beliefs, requirements, and values are the same
initially for the two technologies. Fundamentalists are likely to have very high
requirements and to place a high value on privacy for the explicit and mixed-
content messaging contexts, and higher-than-average requirements for non-sensitive
messaging. The unconcerned have the lowest requirements and values, and the
pragmatists are in between the two other groups.
Change in beliefs. We model the revelation that Snapchat messages are not
securely deleted and can be recovered as a shock which causes a downward shift
in belief about the privacy provided by Snapchat. Beliefs about the competing
product do not change.
Figure 13 shows the share of adoption of the various components of Snapchat
and its competitor over time, as well as the total market share for Snapchat. The
shock occurs after time t = 5.
Table 4. Adoption of different components before and after Snapchat’s non-deletion
of messages is revealed.
Before After
Snapchat explicit 0.014 0.011
Snapchat mixed 0.119 0.094
Snapchat non-sensitive 0.742 0.764
Comp. explicit 0.014 0.028
Comp. mixed 0.038 0.032
Comp. non-sensitive 0.074 0.071
Total Snapchat 0.874 0.869
The initial values, before the shock, are close to the values reported in Roes-
ner [18]. Out of Snapchat’s share—not the total share—1.5% use it for explicit
messages only, compared to 1.6% in Roesner, and 13.2% use it for mixed content,
compared to 14.2%.
Table 4 shows the values of adoption for the different components before
and after the shock. The use of Snapchat for explicit messaging decreases from
1.4% to 1.1%. Similarly, the use of Snapchat for mixed explicit and non-sensitive
messaging declines from 11.9% to 9.4%. The use of Snapchat in a non-sensitive
context actually increases, from 74.2% to 76.4%, showing that agents who have
a high level of privacy requirement in the explicit or mixed-conent messaging
contexts no longer use the technology in those contexts when they believe that
their privacy requirements are no longer being met.
Snapchat’s total share declines post-shock from 87.4% to 86.9%. The agents
that switched technologies to the competitor did so for explicit messaging, which
grew from 1.4% to 2.8%. The beliefs about the security of the competing product
did not change, so agents wishing to use the technology for explicit content were
willing to swtich to a product with less functionality that met their privacy
requirements.
5 Conclusions
We have discussed the characteristics of privacy from the point of view the
economic agent:
– Context : the setting in which and the purpose for which a given technology
is used;
– Requirement : the level of privacy that the technology must provide for an
agent to be willing to use the technology in a given context;
– Belief : an agent’s perception of the level of privacy provided by a given
technology in a given context;
– Relative value of privacy : how much an agent cares about privacy in this
context and how willing an agent is to trade off privacy for other attributes.
We have incorporated these characteristics into a model of technology adoption
by a society of heterogenous decision-making agents.
Our analysis is based on Harris and Westin’s classification of agents as Fun-
damentalist, Pragmatist, and Unconcerned. For each of these groups, we have
assigned a function that determines the utility an agent derives from a techno-
logy, depending upon the agent’s beliefs about how effectively the technology
meets their requirements for protecting their privacy.
We have presented two main examples. First, to demonstrate the effects of
changing beliefs and requirements, we have considered the signal of concern for
privacy suggested by ongoing Apple v FBI dispute. Second, we have demon-
strated the model’s use to capture context by considering the change in types
of messages that are prevalent on Snapchat before and after a change in beliefs
about the level of privacy provided.
The literature on economic modelling of privacy and its role in technology
adoption is quite limited, with [8] and the references therein providing a good
guide. We believe the present paper represents a useful contribution in that we
identify key characteristics, create a model that is capable of capturing them,
and explore, with examples, their significance.
The model we have presented here allows preferred attributes for particular
agents to be specified. Future work might employ empirical studies of the prefer-
ences, beliefs, and requirements of actual agents and incorporate this data into
the model. Similarly, the trade-off functions used for the Westin groups might
be derived from empirical studies.
The model as presented includes a policy component that is not exploited
in this paper. Further work might explore the role of policy in the adoption of
privacy-enhancing technologies.
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